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The particle no in Japanese exhibits two 
types of nominalization: “participant” and 
“situation” nominalization. Despite several 
motivations for a uniform account, only a 
few attempts have been made to address 
no-nominalization uniformly. In this paper, 
I shall develop a unified account within the 
formalism Dynamic Syntax, and show that 
a number of properties of the phenomenon 
follow from the analysis.  
1 Introduction 
The particle no in Japanese displays two types of 
nominalization: “participant” nominalization (1) 
and “situation” nominalization (2).  
 
(1)   [Akai no]-o     Tom-ga nagu-tta.  
[red NO]-ACC   Tom-NOM hit-PAST 
‘Tom hit a/the red one.’  
 
(2)   [Mary-ga kireina   no]-o      
[Mary-NOM beautiful NO]-ACC    
Tom-ga  shi-tteiru.  
Tom-NOM know-PRES 
 ‘Tom knows that Mary is beautiful.’ 
 
In participant nominalization, the particle no turns 
a preceding clause into a nominal that denotes an 
object or a person. In situation nominalization, the 
particle no turns a preceding clause into a nominal 
that denotes an event or a proposition. A case of 
ambiguity is presented in (3).  
 
(3)  [Nai-ta      no]-o       Tom-ga   mi-ta.  
[cry-PAST  NO]-ACC  Tom-NOM   see-PAST 
a. ‘Tom saw someone who cried.’  
b. ‘Tom saw the event of someone’s having cried.’  
 
Participant nominalization is exemplified by (3a), 
and situation nominalization by (3b).
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     One issue that immediately arises is whether no 
in (1, 2, 3) should be treated uniformly. In other 
words, does no in (1, 2, 3) form a single item or are 
there two nos one of which appears in (1, 3a) and 
the other of which appears in (2, 3b)? Seraku (in 
press) defends a uniform analysis based on several 
motivations (e.g. methodological, cross-linguistic, 
functional, diachronic). Despite these motivations, 
a unified analysis of no has been largely untouched 
(e.g. Kitagawa, 2005; Kitagawa and Ross, 1982; 
Murasugi, 1991; Shibatani, 2009; Tonoike, 1990). 
     Against this background, the aim of the present 
paper is twofold as follows. First, I shall articulate 
a unified analysis of no-nominalization within the 
grammar formalism Dynamic Syntax (Cann et al., 
2005; Kempson et al., 2001). Second, I shall show 
                                                          
1 
Seraku (in press) summarizes diachronic data that give 
credence to the exclusion of such data as (i) from the 
analysis to be developed in this paper.  
 
(i) Tom-no 
     Tom-NO 
     ‘Tom’s’ 
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that the analysis captures a range of characteristics 
of the phenomenon.  
2 Dynamic Syntax 
Dynamic Syntax (DS) is a formalism that models 
“knowledge of language”, which is conceived as a 
set of constraints on language use (Cann et al., 
2005; Kempson et al, 2001). Language use consists 
of production and comprehension. DS is shown to 
model production (Cann et al., 2007; Purver et al., 
2006), but this paper focuses on comprehension. 
DS is then said to provide a set of constraints on 
how a parser builds up an interpretation gradually 
as it processes a string word-by-word online.  
     DS models gradual growth of an interpretation 
as successive updating of a semantic tree. A string 
of words is directly mapped onto a semantic tree; 
in this view, a separate level of syntactic structures 
is not postulated. The initial state of semantic tree 
growth is specified by the AXIOM, which sets out 
an initial node to be subsequently developed.  
 
(4)  AXIOM 
 
   ?t, ♢  
 
?t is a requirement that this node be of type-t. That 
is, DS tree growth is goal-driven, the goal being to 
construct a type-t formula. This requirement must 
be satisfied before tree transitions come to an end. 
The pointer ♢ indicates a node under development. 
Once the initial node in (4) is set out, it is gradually 
updated by a combination of general, lexical, and 
pragmatic actions.  
     For illustration, consider the string (5). 
 
(5)  Gakusee-ga nai-ta. 
 student-NOM cry-PAST 
 ‘A/the student cried.’ 
 
The initial state (4) is updated into (6) by the parse 
of gakusee-ga (= ‘student-NOM’). First, the general 
action LOCAL *ADJUNCTION introduces an unfixed 
node, and the lexical actions encoded in gakusee 
decorate the node with semantic content and type. 
This unfixed node is fixed as a subject node by the 
lexical actions of the nominative case particle ga. 
(“Unfixed nodes” is a central DS mechanism, but it 
is not directly relevant to the present paper.)  
 
(6)  Parsing Gakusee-ga 
 
   ?t 
 
(ε, x, gakusee’(x)) : e, ♢  
 
The content of gakusee is (ε, x, gakusee’(x)), a 
type-e term expressed in the Epsilon Calculus.  
     In the Epsilon Calculus, every quantified noun 
is mapped onto a type-e term defined as a triple: an 
operator, a variable, and a restrictor. Syntactically, 
these type-e terms correspond to arbitrary names in 
natural-deduction proofs in predicate logic. So, the 
quantified noun gakusee (= ‘a student’)
2
 is mapped 
onto the epsilon term (7), a type-e term consisting 
of the existential operator ε, the variable x, and 
the restrictor gakusee’(x). 
 
(7)  (ε, x, gakusee’(x)) 
 
If the term (7) is combined with the predicate 
gakusee’, as in (8), the equivalence relation holds 
for (8) and the predicate-logic formula (9).  
 
(8)  gakusee’(ε, x, gakusee’(x)) 
 
(9)  ∃x.gakusee’(x) 
 
Semantically, the term (7) stands for an arbitrary 
witness of the predicate logic formula (9).  
     The next item to be parsed is nai (= ‘cry’). As 
Japanese is fully pro-drop (i.e. arguments do not 
have to be explicitly uttered), a predicate builds up 
a template for a propositional structure. In the case 
of nai, it builds up an open propositional structure, 
where a subject node is decorated with a place-
holding variable. Moreover, à la Davidson (1967), 
it is claimed that all predicates take a type-e event 
term as an argument (Gregoromichelaki, 2011). So, 
the predicate nai constructs an open propositional 
structure with the argument slots for a subject term 
and an event term, as in (10). The subject node is 
decorated with the place-holding variable V, and 
the event node with the place-holding variable U. 
In order to distinguish event terms from non-event 
terms, the type for event terms is notated as eS, 
where “s” stands for a “situation”. 
                                                          
2
 Japanese lacks determiners, and the quantificational 
force of a bare noun is contextually inferred (cf. §4.2).  
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 (10)   ?t, ♢   
 
U : eS  ?(eS→t)  
 
V : e  nai’ : e→(eS→t) 
 
Notice that a subject node has already been created 
in (6). Thus, the subject node in (6) and that in (10) 
collapse. The content at the subject node in (10) is 
the place-holding variable V, and it is weaker than 
the content at the subject node in (6). Therefore, 
the collapse of the two subject nodes is harmless. 
At this stage, the tree (6) is updated into (11).  
 
(11)  Parsing Gakusee-ga nai 
  
 ?t, ♢  
 
(ε, s, E(s)) : eS ?(eS→t) 
 
        (ε, x, gakusee’(x)) : e    nai’ : e→(eS→t) 
 
U is now replaced with the event term (ε, s, E(s)), 
where E is an event predicate. For discussion of 
event predicates, see Cann (2011).  
     As two daughter nodes are specified for content 
and type, functional application and type-deduction 
may occur. These processes are formalized as the 
general action ELIMINATION. Thus, the tree (11) is 
updated into (12) after ELIMINATION is run twice.  
 
(12)  ELIMINATION  
 
nai’(ε, x, gakusee’(x))(ε, s, E(s)) : t, ♢  
 
(ε, s, E(s)) : eS  nai’(ε, x, gakusee’(x)) : eS→t 
 
       (ε, x, gakusee’(x)) : e    nai’ : e→(eS→t) 
 
Notice that the requirement ?t has been deleted at 
the root node in (12) since the type-t formula has 
appeared at this node.  
     Finally, the parse of the past tense suffix ta adds 
tense information to the tree. Tense is represented 
as a restrictor within an event term (Cann, 2011), 
but this issue is disregarded in this paper. Thus, for 
the sake of simplicity, I take it that (12) is the final 
state of the tree transitions for the string (5).  
     The proposition in (12) contains two terms, and 
their scope relation needs to be explicated.
3
 In a 
fully articulated tree, a top node of a propositional 
structure is decorated with a “scope statement”, 
which is incrementally constructed as a string is 
parsed. The detail is not pertinent; what is at stake 
is that once tree transitions come to a final state, a 
proposition at the root node and a complete scope 
statement are subject to QUANTIFIER EVALUATION 
(Q-EVALUATION). Through this process, each term 
in the proposition is enriched so as to explicate the 
scope dependencies in the whole proposition. For 
illustration, consider the schematic formula (13).  
 
(13)  φ(ε, x,ψ(x)) 
 
Firstly, the predicates φ and ψ, with the term “a” 
whose content is worked out below, are connected. 
The type of a connective is determined by the type 
of an operator; for the existential operatorε, the 
connective & is employed. 
 
(14)  φ(a)&ψ(a) 
 
Secondly, “a” is constructed so that it reflects the 
predicates in the whole proposition.  
 
(15)  φ(a)&ψ(a) 
 
     a = (ε, x, φ(x)&ψ(x)) 
 
Now, let us return to the proposition in (12), which 
is repeated here as (16).  
 
(16)  nai’(ε, x, gakusee’(x))(ε, s, E(s))  
 
Suppose that the scope statement declares that the 
event term out-scopes the non-event term. In this 
case, a parser first evaluates the non-event term.  
 
(17)  Evaluating the non-event term  
 
gakusee’(a)&nai’(a)(ε, s, E(s)) 
 
     a = (ε, x, gakusee’(x)&nai’(x)(ε, s, E(s))) 
                                                          
3
 In (12), different scope relations do not affect the 
truth-conditional content, because only existential 
quantifications are involved. But the issue is not trivial 
when different types of quantifications are involved. 
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 Next, the event term in (17) is evaluated.  
 




     b = (ε, s, E(s)&[gakusee’(as)&nai’(as)(s)]) 
     ab = (ε, x, gakusee’(x)&nai’(x)(b)) 
     as = (ε, x, gakusee’(x)&nai’(x)(s)) 
 
The technical detail is not germane; what should be 
noted is that the event term “b” and the non-event 
term “ab” explicate the scope dependencies in the 
whole formula. (“as” is not a full-blown term since 
the variable “s” is not bound in the term; “as” is 
just part of “b”.) The formula (18) represents the 
indefinite reading of (5): ‘A student cried.’  
     To sum up, DS models the incremental nature 
of language use; a parser progressively constructs 
an interpretation in context on the basis of word-
by-word parsing. This exegesis has not mentioned 
the mechanism of LINK, a core machinery of DS. 
This is illustrated in the next section since it is 
essential for the analysis of the particle no.  
3 A Uniform Analysis  
3.1 Proposal 
A novel feature of DS tree transitions is a pair of 
structures that are connected by a LINK relation. A 
LINKed structure is an adjunct structure to a main 
structure, and their relation is guaranteed by the 
presence of a shared element.  
     Cann et al. (2005: p.285) analyze the particle no 
as a LINK-inducing device.  
 
(19)  Lexical entry of no 
 
IF         t 
THEN     IF          Φ[a] 
       THEN     make(L-1); go(L-1); put(a : e) 
       ELSE      abort 
     ELSE     abort 
 
In general, every lexical item encodes a constraint 
on tree growth. The IF-line specifies a condition; if 
the condition is met, a parser looks at the THEN- 
line; otherwise the ELSE-line. In (19), “abort” is 
an action that quits tree transitions, in which case a 
string is said to be ungrammatical. “make(L)” is an 
action that introduces a LINK relation, “go(L)” is 
an action that moves the pointer ♢ to a LINKed 
node, and “put(a : e)” is an action that decorates a 
node with “a : e”. In plain English, the entry of no 
amounts to the constraint (20); the corresponding 
tree-update is shown in (21).  
 
(20)  If a current node is decorated with a type-t 
 proposition, a parser copies a type-e term 
 in the evaluated proposition and pastes it at 
 a type-e node across a LINK relation.  
 
(21)    
 




In (21), a parser copies the type-e term “a” in the 
evaluated version of the proposition Φ and pastes 
it at a type-e node across a LINK relation. The 
LINK relation is shown by the curved arrow.  
     Given the entry of no in (19), my proposals are 
formulated as (22).  
 
(22)  The two types of no-nominalization can be
 reduced to a parser’s choice of what type-e 
 term it copies in processing no.  
 a. Copying of a non-event term gives rise to 
 participant nominalization.  
 b. Copying of an event term gives rise to 
 situation nominalization. 
3.2 Participant Nominalization 
Let us start with the participant nominalization (1), 
reproduced here as (23).  
 
(23)  [Akai no]-o     Tom-ga nagu-tta. 
[red NO]-ACC   Tom-NOM hit-PAST 
‘Tom hit a/the red one.’  
 
The initial state is determined by the AXIOM:  
 
(24)  AXIOM  
 
   ?t, ♢  
 
The predicate akai (= ‘red’) in (23) constructs a 
propositional template with subject and event slots. 
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The event node is decorated with (ε, s, E(s)), and 
the subject node is decorated with (ε, x, P(x)), 
where P is an abstract restrictor (Kempson and 
Kurosawa, 2009: p.65). Then, the general action 
ELIMINATION is conducted twice, and the tree (24) 
is updated into (25).  
 
(25)  Parsing Akai  
 
     akai’(ε, x, P(x))(ε, s, E(s)) : t, ♢  
 
(ε, s, E(s)) : eS  akai’(ε, x, P(x)) : eS→t  
 
(ε, x, P(x)) : e    akai’ : e→(eS→t)  
 
     Once a proposition emerges, it is subject to Q-
EVALUATION. As the proposition in (25), repeated 
here as (26), involves two terms, Q-EVALUATION 
is conducted twice.  
 
(26)  akai’(ε, x, P(x))(ε, s, E(s)) 
 
Let us suppose that the scope statement declares 
that the non-event term out-scopes the event term; 
in this case, the event term is evaluated first.   
 
(27)  Evaluating the event term (ε, s, E(s)) 
 
E(a)&akai’(ε, x, P(x))(a) 
 
     a = (ε, s, E(s)&akai’(ε, x, P(x))(s)) 
 
The formula (27) still contains a type-e term. This 
term is evaluated as follows:  
 




     b = (ε, x, P(x)&[E(ax)&akai’(x)(ax)]) 
     ab = (ε, s, E(s)&akai’(b)(s)) 
     ax = (ε, s, E(s)&akai’(x)(s)) 
 
The formula (28) is the final representation for the 
interpretation of the pre-no clause akai.  
     Now, it is time to parse no; a parser copies a 
type-e term and pastes it at a type-e node across a 
LINK relation. In (29), what is copied is the non-
event term “b” in the evaluated proposition.4  
 
(29)  Parsing Akai no  
 
akai’(ε, x, P(x))(ε, s, E(s)) : t  b : e, ♢  
 
 
     b = (ε, x, P(x)&[E(ax)&akai’(x)(ax)]) 
     ax = (ε, s, E(s)&akai’(x)(s)) 
 
The node decorated with “b” becomes an object 
node by the lexical actions of the accusative case 
particle o. Then, the matrix predicate nagu (= ‘hit’) 
constructs a propositional template; in (30), the 
event node is decorated with (ε , t, F(t)), the 
subject node is decorated with Tom’, and the object 
node is decorated with “b”. (As for the object 
node, the node decorated with “b” in (29) collapses 
with the object node introduced by nagu.) 
 
(30)  Parsing [Akai no]-o Tom-ga nagu  
 
 ?t, ♢  
 
   (ε, t, F(t)) : eS ?(eS→t) 
 
           Tom’ : e        ?(e→(eS→t)) 
 
   b : e       nagu’ : e→(e→(eS→t)) 
akai’(ε, x, P(x))(ε, s, E(s)) : t 
 
 
     b = (ε, x, P(x)&[E(ax)&akai’(x)(ax)]) 
     ax = (ε, s, E(s)&akai’(x)(s)) 
 
     Finally, the general action ELIMINATION is run 
three times. The past tense marker tta being set 
aside, the tree (31) is the final state, and the top 
node represents the indefinite reading of the string 
(23): ‘Tom hit a red one.’ (For the definite reading 
of (23), see Section 4.2.)  
 
                                                          
4
 A parser could copy the event term “ab” but it leads to 
tree transition crash, since the matrix predicate nagu (= 
‘hit’) cannot take an event term as an argument. As for 
“ax”, a parser cannot copy it, since it is not a full-blown 
term in that the variable “x” is not bound within the 
term; “ax” is part of the evaluated non-event term “b”. 
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(31)  ELIMINATION  
 
nagu’(b)(Tom’)(ε, t, F(t)) : t, ♢  
 
(ε, t, F(t)) : eS     nagu’(b)(Tom’) : eS→t 
 
           Tom’ : e      nagu’(b) : e→(eS→t) 
 
   b : e       nagu’ : e→(e→(eS→t)) 
akai’(ε, x, P(x))(ε, s, E(s)) : t 
 
 
     b = (ε, x, P(x)&[E(ax)&akai’(x)(ax)]) 
     ax = (ε, s, E(s)&akai’(x)(s)) 
3.3 Situation Nominalization 
Let us move on to situation nominalization. The 
example (2) is repeated here as (32).  
 
(32)  [Mary-ga kireina   no]-o  
[Mary-NOM beautiful NO]-ACC    
Tom-ga  shi-tteiru.  
Tom-NOM know-PRES 
 ‘Tom knows that Mary is beautiful.’ 
 
As always, the initial state of tree transitions is set 
out by the AXIOM. Given the tree transitions in the 
last sub-section, the parse of (32) prior to no yields 
the tree (33).  
 
(33)  Parsing Mary-ga kireina 
 
kireina’(Mary’)(ε, s, E(s)) : t, ♢   
 
(ε, s, E(s)) : eS  kireina’(Mary’) : eS→t  
 
      Mary’ : e             kireina’: e→(eS→t)  
 
The lexical actions of kireina (= ‘beautiful’) builds 
up a propositional structure with two slots. The 
event slot is filled by the event term (ε, s, E(s)), 
and the subject slot collapses with the node that 
has been created by the parse of Mary-ga.  
     The top node in the tree (33) is decorated with 
the proposition, which is re-cited here as (34). This 
proposition is subject to Q-EVALUATION, and the 
proposition (35) is engendered.  
 
(34)  kireina’(Mary’)(ε, s, E(s))  
 




     a = (ε, s, E(s)&kireina’(Mary’)(s)) 
 
     Next, no copies the evaluated event term “a” 
and pastes it at a node across a LINK relation.5  
 
(36)  Parsing Mary-ga kireina no  
 
kireina’(Mary’)(ε, s, E(s)) : t  a : eS, ♢  
 
 
     a = (ε, s, E(s)&kireina’(Mary’)(s)) 
 
     The current node in (36) is fixed as an object 
node by the accusative case particle o, and the 
parse of Tom-ga creates a subject node. These two 
nodes collapse with the nodes introduced by the 
predicate shi (= ‘know’). After ELIMINATION is run 
three times, the tree (36) is updated into (37). 
 
(37)  Parsing [Mary-ga kireina no]-o Tom-ga 
 shi-tteitu  
 
  shi’(a)(Tom’)(ε, t, F(t)) : t, ♢  
 
(ε, t, F(t)) : eS  shi’(a)(Tom’) : eS→t 
 
    Tom’ : e  shi’(a) : e→(eS→t) 
 
a : eS          shi’ : eS→(e→(eS→t)) 
kireina’(Mary’)(ε, s, E(s)) : t 
 
 
     a = (ε, s, E(s)&kireina’(Mary’)(s)) 
 
This is a final state of the tree transitions, and the 
root node represents the interpretation of the string 
(32): ‘Tom knows that Mary is beautiful.’ 
                                                          
5
 A parser could copy another type-e term: the evaluated 
term for Mary. (For this purpose, Mary is mapped onto 
an iota term.) In fact, copying of this term leads to Cann 
et al.’s (2005) analysis of head-internal relatives. 
However, the string in question cannot be so interpreted 
due to the Relevancy Condition (Kuroda, 1992: p.147).  
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4 Consequences 
4.1 No as a Dependent Item 
Makino (1968: p.51) observes that no cannot stand 
on its own. Compare (38) with (1)/(23). 
 
(38)    * No-o  Tom-ga  nagu-tta. 
NO-ACC Tom-NOM hit-PAST 
 
Makino considers only participant nominalization, 
but it is also true of situation nominalization. (39) 
should be compared with (2)/(32).  
 
(39)    * No-o  Tom-ga  shi-tteiru. 
NO-ACC Tom-NOM know-PRES 
 
These data are amenable to my analysis. The entry 
of no requires that a proposition should have been 
constructed before the parse of no. Formally, this 
requirement is expressed in the two IF-clauses in 
the entry of no in (19). In (38, 39), however, no 
items precede no in the strings, and a parser cannot 
build up a proposition before processing no.   
4.2 Indeterminacy of Denotation  
Denotation of the no-headed part is indeterminate 
in two respects. Firstly, as shown in (1), repeated 
here as (40), it is indeterminate with regard to the 
definiteness of the denotation.  
 
(40)      [Akai no]-o     Tom-ga nagu-tta.  
[red NO]-ACC   Tom-NOM hit-PAST 
‘Tom hit a/the red one.’  
 
In Section 3.2, it was argued that the parse of Akai 
no yields the epsilon term (41).  
 
(41)     (ε, x, P(x)&akai’(x)) 
 
Since DS is not encapsulated in Fodor’s (1983) 
sense, pragmatics comes in during DS tree growth. 
For the model of pragmatics, I assume Relevance 
Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). Thus, if it is 
inferable that the speaker has in mind a definite 
entity, a parser may strengthen the epsilon operator
ε in (41) as the iota operatorι, as in (42).  
 
(42)     (ι, x, P(x)&akai’(x)) 
 
This models the definite reading of the string (40) 
à la Russellian treatment of definite descriptions 
(Russell, 1905).  
     Secondly, the content of the no-headed part is 
indeterminate. So, when it is pragmatically inferred 
that a speaker has in mind a specific entity, say, a 
red person, the term (41) may be enriched as (43), 
where hito’ is the content of hito (= ‘person’).  
 
(43)     (ε, x, P(x)&[akai’(x)&hito’(x)]) 
 
     These two types of indeterminacies are captured 
in my analysis, since pragmatic inference interacts 
with DS structure building.  
4.3 Expressivity  
It is well known that if the no-headed part denotes 
a human in participant nominalization, derogatory 
expressivity is observed (Kitagawa, 2005: p.1259). 
Consider (1, 2, 3), repeated here as (44, 45, 46); 
expressivity is found in participant nominalization 
(44, 46a), but not in situation nominalization (45, 
46b).  
 
(44)   [Akai no]-o     Tom-ga nagu-tta.  
[red NO]-ACC   Tom-NOM hit-PAST 
‘Tom hit a/the red one.’  
 
(45)   [Mary-ga kireina   no]-o      
[Mary-NOM beautiful NO]-ACC    
Tom-ga  shi-tteiru.  
Tom-NOM know-PRES 
 ‘Tom knows that Mary is beautiful.’ 
 
(46)  [Nai-ta      no]-o       Tom-ga   mi-ta.  
[cry-PAST  NO]-ACC  Tom-NOM   see-PAST 
a. ‘Tom saw someone who cried.’  
b. ‘Tom saw the event of someone’s having cried.  
 
What has not been reported in the literature is that 
expressivity is not always derogatory. To take (44) 
as an example, if the denoted person’s face turns 
red after a pint of beer and the speaker hits the 
person in jest, expressivity may be “affectionate 
familiarity with the denoted person”. Any adequate 
account of no must model this context-dependency 
of expressivity (Yuji Nishiyama, p.c.).  
     To account for the above data, I shall posit the 
constraint that the denotation of the no-headed part 
should be an object (rather than a human), the idea 
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being that if the no-headed part denotes a human, 
expressivity emerges through pragmatic inference.
6
  
     First, in (44), given the predicate nagu (= ‘hit’), 
a parser expects that akai no denotes a human, and 
constructs, say, the term (47), which denotes a red 
person (cf. §4.2).  
 
(47)     (ε, x, P(x)&[akai’(x)&hito’(x)]) 
 
That the term (47) denotes a human indicates that 
the speaker treats a denoted person as if s/he were 
a thing, which has a pragmatic implication that the 
speaker does not treat the person respectfully. This 
pragmatic inference yields derogatory expressivity.  
     This pragmatic analysis naturally accounts for 
the context-dependence of expressivity. Consider 
the context where the speaker is a good friend of 
the denoted person. In this context, that the term 
(47) denotes a human indicates that the speaker 
frankly describes a person, which has a pragmatic 
implication that the speaker shows a sign of close 
friendship. In this case, the type of expressivity is 
affectionate familiarity with the denoted person. 
This pragmatic analysis is extendable to (46a).  
     It is predicted that if the no-headed part denotes 
a non-human, expressivity should be absent:  
 
(48)   [Akai no]-o     Tom-ga tabe-ta.  
[red NO]-ACC   Tom-NOM eat-PAST 
‘Tom ate a/the red one.’  
 
In (48), due to the predicate tabe (= ‘eat’), the term 
copied by no denotes a non-human (e.g. apple). So, 
the pragmatic inference mentioned above is not 
triggered, and expressivity is not engendered.  
     Next, how about the absence of expressivity in 
(45, 46b)? In these cases, no copies an event term 
                                                          
6
 This constraint may be modeled along the lines with 
Cann and Wu’s (2011) analysis of the bei construction 
in Chinese. They argue that bei marks the pre-bei item 
as the locus of affect; bei projects a propositional 
structure where the Locus-of-Affect (LoA) predicate 
takes as an internal argument the content of the pre-bei 
item, and as an external argument the content of the rest 
of the string. In their analysis, the LoA predicate is 
underspecified for the type of affect, and thus it fits well 
with the context-dependency of no-expressivity. I shall 
assume that the entry of no has a constraint that if a term 
to be copied does not denote an object, it projects a 
structure involving the LoA predicate. This ramification 
of the entry of no is not attempted in this paper.  
(cf. §3.3). Since an event is not a human, the 
pragmatic inference mentioned above does not take 
place, and expressivity does not emerge.  
     The present account has some implications for a 
cross-linguistic study of nominalization. Consider 
(49), the Korean counterpart of (46).  
 
(49)  [Wu-nun kes]-ul 
[cry-MOD KES]-ACC  
Tom-i  pwa-ss-ta. 
Tom-NOM see-PAST-DECL 
a. *‘Tom saw someone who cried.’  
b. ‘Tom saw the event of someone’s having cried.  
 
While (49b) is acceptable, (49a) is not
7
. Of note is 
that, unlike no, the nominalizer kes derived from 
the noun kes meaning ‘thing’, and that this lexical 
meaning somehow persists in the nominalizer kes 
(Horie, 2008: p.178). So, the restriction that the 
denoted entity be an object is stronger in kes than 
in no; this is why the reading (46a) in Japanese is 
possible but the reading (49a) in Korean is not.  
     In closing, let me examine some previous works 
that are relevant to the present discussion. Firstly, 
McGloin (1985) also suggests, albeit very briefly, 
a pragmatic analysis of expressivity. However, in 
her analysis, neither situation nominalization nor 
the context-dependency of expressivity is treated.  
     Second, from the perspective of the Principles-
and-Parameters Theory, Kitagawa (2005) suggests 
that expressivity emerges only if the external-head 
pro has an indefinite referent. However, suppose 
that (50) is uttered with a pointing gesture; further, 
the demonstrative sono (= ‘that’) is used in order to 
ensure that the small pro has a definite referent.  
 
(50)   Sono [akai no]-o 
that [red NO]-ACC 
Tom-ga  nagu-tta.  
Tom-NOM hit-PAST 
‘Tom hit that red one.’  
 
In (50), expressivity is still observed, contrary to 
what Kitagawa (2005) would predict. My analysis 
                                                          
7
  The degraded status of (49a) does not mean that kes 
lacks participant nominalization. In fact, if wu-nun in 
(49) is replaced with kkayeci-nun (= break-MOD), the 
string exhibits the participant-nominalization reading: 
‘Tom saw something (e.g. machine) that was being 
broken.’  
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postulates neither a null element nor an external-
head position; the presence of expressivity in (50) 
is expected as a result of pragmatic inference.  
4.4 Nature of Denotation 
In Kamio (1983) and McGloin (1985), it is stated 
that no in participant nominalization cannot refer 
to abstract entities. Consider the contrast between 
(51) and (52) (Kamio, 1983: p.82). 
 
(51)     [[katai shinnen]-o motta] hito 
[[solid belief]-ACC have] person 
 ‘a person who has a solid belief’ 
 
(52)    * [[katai no]-o  motta] hito 
[[solid NO]-ACC have] person 
 Int. ‘a person who has a solid belief’ 
 
The string (52) is acceptable if the no-headed part 
is meant to denote some non-abstract entity, such 
as a stone.  
     It seems, however, that the above generalization 
is suspicious. In (52), the use of the predicate katai 
(= ‘solid’) is metaphorical; it drives the interpreter 
to look for a physical object to which the predicate 
katai normally applies (e.g. stone). This is why it is 
hard to get the intended interpretation in (52). If a 
predicate that is congruous with an abstract object 
is used, such as settokutekina (= ‘convincing’), the 
no-headed part may denote an abstract entity:  
 
(53)     [gakkai-de [settokutekina no]-o 
[conference-at [convincing NO]-ACC
 teijishita] hito 
presented] person 
 ‘a person who presented a convincing 
 one (e.g. argument) at a conference’ 
 
     Given my unitary analysis of no, it is expected 
that if the no-headed part may denote an abstract 
entity in participant nominalization, it should also 
hold of situation nominalization. This expectation 
is confirmed. First, consider (54).  
 
(54)     Tom-wa [[ni tasu ni]-ga   
Tom-TOP [[2 plus 2]-NOM  
yon dearu       no]-o       shitteiru 
 4 COPULA       NO]-ACC know 
‘Tom knows that 2 plus 2 equals 4.’ 
 
In this example, the no-headed part denotes the 
abstract proposition that 2 plus 2 equals 4. Second, 
as pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, modal 
statements, which seem to denote propositions, can 
be nominalized by no. This is illustrated in (55).  
 
(55)     [Mary-ga kuru       kamoshirenai 
[Mary-NOM come        might 
no]-o  omoidashita. 
 NO]-ACC remembered 
‘I remembered that Mary might come.’ 
 
     But there is some indication that no in situation 
nominalization tends to denote a perceptible event. 
Kuno (1973: p.222) notes that in (56), if no is used, 
it denotes Tom’s death as a tangible event, whereas 
if the situation nominalizer koto is employed, it 
denotes Tom’s death as a less tangible event. (See 
also Watanabe (2008).)  
 
(56)     [John-ga shinda no/koto]-wa 
[John-NOM died NO/KOTO]-TOP 
tashika desu.  
certain COPULA   
‘It is certain that John has died.’ 
 
I contend that this difference between no and koto 
reflects the origins of these two items. As noted in 
Horie (2008: p.174), there are no confirmed lexical 
origins for no, but koto is a diachronically bleached 
development of the noun koto, meaning ‘matter’ or 
‘event’. It may then be assumed that koto retains 
the property of denoting an event as a matter, and 
that this lexical residue is encoded as a constraint 
in the nominalizer koto (but not in the nominalizer 
no). Then, the difference in (56) can be analyzed as 
the difference in the encoded constraints of koto 
and no. But this reasoning raises another problem: 
as shown below, koto does not exhibit participant 
nominalization; compare (57) with (44).  
 
(57)    * [Akai koto]-o        Tom-ga nagu-tta.  
[red KOTO]-ACC  Tom-NOM hit-PAST 
 
As stated above, the nominalizer kes in Korean, 
which also derived from the noun meaning ‘thing’, 
allows not only situation but also participant 
nominalization. This functional difference between 
koto and kes is a remaining issue.  
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5 Conclusion 
This article has proposed an integrated analysis of 
no-nominalization within Dynamic Syntax, and has 
accounted for a number of characteristics of the 
phenomenon. The particle no is assigned a single 
lexical entry, and the participant/situation divide 
boils down to an outcome of semantic tree growth, 
more specifically, a parser’s choice of what type-e 
term it copies. In this account, incrementality is a 
key notion, as the participant/situation distinction 
arises at the timing of processing no. 
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